



## AT-LARGE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

### ALAC Statement on the Review of Trusted Community Representation in Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing Ceremonies

#### Introduction

Salanieta Tamanikawaiwaimaro, At-Large member from the Asian, Australasian and Pacific Islands Regional At-Large Organization (APRALO), composed an initial draft of this Statement after discussion of the topic within At-Large and on the Mailing Lists.

On 31 January 2014, this Statement was posted on the [At-Large Review of Trusted Community Representation in Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing Ceremonies Workspace](#).

On that same day, Olivier Crépin-Leblond, Chair of the ALAC, requested ICANN Policy Staff in support of the ALAC to send a Call for Comments on the Recommendations to all At-Large members via the [ALAC-Announce Mailing list](#).

On 11 February 2014, a version incorporating the comments received was TCRs. There on the aforementioned workspace and the Chair requested that Staff open an ALAC ratification vote on the proposed Statement.

On 18 February 2014, Staff confirmed that the online vote resulted in the ALAC endorsing the Statement with 12 votes in favor, 0 votes against, and 0 abstentions. You may review the result independently under: <https://www.bigpulse.com/pollresults?code=3671kiPvCmlyu7uGxuVFEMwg>.

#### Summary of Answers to questions asked

1. The current TCR model has been effectively performing its functions of ensuring trust in the KSK management process.
2. Whilst some believe that the size of the TCR pool is large enough, others believe that the current size needs to be expanded to cater for unforeseen circumstances (includes but is not limited to terrorist attacks, flight disruptions, state of emergency, civil war, etc) that could render a majority of the 21 TCRs unable to attend to their responsibilities. The possibility of having signing at the same time in either the same country or different countries or frequency of signing could also exhaust reserves leading to overburdening these volunteers.
3. The community believes that TCRs should meet the existing criteria merited of what would comprise a responsible TCR. TCRs should actively engage by writing reports which are made public. Minimum participation should include, attendance, engagement, carrying out responsibilities, writing full and thorough reports and listing concerns if any.
4. Whilst some believe that the existing pool and their indefinite terms are sufficient and that the 21 TCRs are more than enough, others believe that there is a need for term limits as the original TCR mechanism is silent on the term. There should be a constant requirement to disclose any and all potential conflicts of interest to disable the risk of "capture" by any stakeholder or interest.
5. Some believe that the current system should be retained although TCRs should be cost-neutral for those not supported by firms or other entities. Others believe in an externally managed fund like the one set-up for the Independent Objector (IO).

The original version of this document is the English text available at <http://www.atlarge.icann.org/correspondence>. Where a difference of interpretation exists or is perceived to exist between a non-English edition of this document and the original text, the original shall prevail.

# ALAC Statement on the Review of Trusted Community Representation in Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing Ceremonies

The At Large Community recognizes the role and significance that the DNS plays in ensuring interoperability. We recognize the importance of DNSSEC in the security, stability and resiliency of the Internet in the root zone and the subsequent deployment in DNS Infrastructure. Noting that at the time this statement was written there were [427 TLDs in the root zone of which 235 are signed and that 229 have trust anchors published in the DS records in the root zone whilst 4 TLDs have trust anchors published in the ISC DLV Repository](#), we hope that in time more TLDs will move towards having trust anchors published.

The Root Zone Key Signing Ceremony points to one of ICANN's important functions of preserving accountability and transparency in the manner in which it conducts its DNSSEC Key Signing Ceremonies.

We recognize the unique combination the key-signing and TCRs make of broad participation, transparency and accountability in order to serve the central function of preserving and enhancing the stability, security and resilience of the DNS, thus engendering widespread trust.

We would like to congratulate all the stakeholders involved in the KSK management process on the services since the first KSK signing ceremony till to date. We welcome the opportunity to contribute to the Review of Trusted Community Representation in Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing Ceremonies. Following consultations with the At Large community along the questions that was raised, we found that on some issues there was divergence of views and we have captured both views.

## **1. Is the current TCR model effectively performing its function of ensuring trust in the KSK management process?**

The current Trusted Community Representative (TCR) model has been effectively performing its functions of ensuring trust in the KSK management process; however, we make the following observations.

The Abbreviation Draft of the Key Signing Ceremony Annotated Scripts, which provides a permanent trusted record of the Ceremony, does not include a definition for "EW" when these appear to be sometimes the largest number of category of people at the Ceremony. The Key Signing Ceremony Annotated Scripts do not clearly state whether there are no other participants (including Camera person) present apart from those listed.

## **2. Is the current size of the TCR pool appropriate to ensure sufficient participation in the ceremonies, while not overburdening the availability of specific volunteers?**

There are two different views on this. The first view is that the current size of the TCR pool is sufficient. The second view is that the current size needs to be expanded to cater for unforeseen circumstances (includes but is not limited to terrorist attacks, flight disruptions, state of emergency, civil war, etc) that could render a majority of the 21 TCRs unable to attend to their responsibilities. The possibility of having signing at the same time in either the same country or different countries or frequency of signing could also exhaust reserves leading to overburdening these volunteers. There might be some merit in expanding the pool and retaining the TCRs whilst rotating them from within the pool of candidate TCRs.

**3. Should there be a minimum level of participation required of a TCR in order to be considered to be successfully discharging their duties?**

The community believes that TCRs should meet the existing criteria merited of what would comprise a responsible TCR. TCRs should actively engage by writing reports which are made public. Minimum participation should include, attendance, engagement, carrying out responsibilities, writing full and thorough reports and listing concerns if any.

**4. There is no standard provision to refresh the list of TCRs except when they are replaced due to inability to effectively perform their function. Should there be a process to renew the pool of TCRs, such as using term limits or another rotation mechanism.**

There are two views on this matter. The first view is that the existing pool and their indefinite terms are sufficient and that the 21 TCRs are more than enough to meet possible contingencies that may arise. That there is no need for process to renew the pool neither of TCRs nor to use term limits or introduce a rotation mechanism.

The other view is that there is a need for term limits as the original TCR mechanism is silent on the term. Given the Internet reaches an estimated 2.6 billion users all over the world, there should be enough candidates able to meet the criteria of being a TCR. The number of candidate or backup TCRs can also be increased. Regardless, where there is an assumption of indefinite service as a TCR, there should be a constant requirement to disclose any and all potential conflicts of interest to disable the risk of “capture” by any stakeholder or interest.

**5. The current model does not compensate TCRs for their services in order to ensure their independence from ICANN.**

**a. Should the model of TCRs paying the costs of their participation be retained?**

**b. Would some form of compensation to offset the expenses incurred by the TCRs detract from their independence in performing the role?**

**c. If you support compensating TCRs for their expenses, are there requirements or limitations on whom the funding organization should be?**

There are two divergent views in relation to this. The first view holds that the current model where TCRs pay the costs should be retained. TCRs should be cost-neutral for those not supported by firms or other entities should suffice. To create another source of travel funds for TCRs is poor and unwarranted.

The second view acknowledges the financial burden placed on TCRs. Although TCRs are volunteers, a system should be set in place that guarantees independence yet allows them to carry out their duty. A fund should be managed externally that is independent that can cater for the expenses of the TCRs. There should be limitations on those who can contribute to this fund. Any funds or gifts being awarded to the TCR should be promptly and formally disclosed through appropriate avenues. One of the suggestions for possible funding model is where ICANN sets up the fund as in the case of the Office of the Independent Objector (IO) where ICANN does not interfere with the decisions of the (IO).